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A B S T R A C T
Where rights over natural resources are contested, the eﬀectiveness of conservation may be undermined and it
can be diﬃcult to estimate the welfare impacts of conservation restrictions on local people. In particular, re-
searchers face the dilemma of estimating respondents’ Willingness To Pay (WTP) for rights to resources, or their
Willingness To Accept (WTA) compensation for foregoing these rights. We conducted a discrete choice experi-
ment with respondents living next to a new protected area in Madagascar, using a split-sample design to ad-
minister both WTP and WTA formats, followed by debrieﬁng interviews. We ﬁrst examined the diﬀerences in
response patterns to the formats and their performance in our study context. We also used the two formats to
elicit respondents’ attitudes to conservation restrictions and property rights over forestlands. We found that the
format aﬀected the relative importance of diﬀerent attributes: WTA respondents strongly favoured livelihood
projects and secure tenure whereas neither attributes were signiﬁcant for WTP respondents. The WTA format
outperformed WTP format on three validity criteria: it was perceived to be more plausible and consequential; led
to fewer protest responses; and was more appropriate given very low incomes. Seventy-three percent of re-
spondents did not accept the legitimacy of state protection and strongly aspired to secure forest tenure. The use
of a WTP format may thus be inappropriate even if respondents do not hold formal rights over resources. We
conclude that estimating the opportunity costs of stopping de jure illegal activities is diﬃcult and coercive
conservation lacks procedural legitimacy and may not achieve full compensations. Our ﬁndings question the
viability of the current conservation model and highlight the importance to conservation policy of locally le-
gitimate property rights over forestlands.
1. Introduction
By forming and restoring soils, forests have underpinned agriculture
worldwide (Sunderlin et al., 2005). The removal of forest cover pro-
vides access to fertile soils for millions of small farmers in the tropics,
and has therefore supported their livelihoods for decades (Sunderlin
et al., 2005). In most low-income tropical countries, the conversion of
natural forests to small scale swidden agriculture has been described as
the main proximate cause of deforestation (van Rijnsoever et al., 2015)
and primary forests continue to be used for swidden cultivation (Kim
et al., 2015a). Small farmers often view swidden agriculture as a low
labour, low capital, and risk minimising farming strategy promising
greater ﬂexibility than more intensive agricultural systems that require
onerous investments and technical training (Nielsen et al., 2006; Scales,
2014). Clearing forests for swidden agriculture may provide higher
returns to local communities than leaving them standing (Godoy et al.,
2000). Local people may therefore incur net welfare losses from con-
servation actions restricting forest clearance.
Protected areas are seen as a major conservation tool for preserving
biodiversity. The continuing habitat loss in the tropics has motivated
their expansion and the setting of more stringent protection targets
(Perrings et al., 2010). However, much of the protected area network in
low-income countries is characterised by considerable confusion and
dispute over property rights (White and Martin, 2002). While govern-
ments have de jure ownership of forestlands in many tropical countries
(commonly inherited from colonial regimes), they have often been
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unable to enforce these claims owing to complex factors including
funding shortfalls, recurrent political instability and exceptionally high
levels of corruption (Bruner et al., 2004). In addition, state ownership is
often contested by indigenous communities who claim customary rights
over forestlands through settlement (White and Martin, 2002). Despite
long-standing customary ownership rights, local communities may be
completely excluded from forests, or devolved only the responsibility to
manage forest resources (Dressler et al., 2010). Property rights to for-
estlands are clearly a key and contentious issue in forest conservation in
many tropical countries.
Ambiguous property rights also pose challenges to the ex-ante va-
luation of the welfare impacts of forest use restrictions. Researchers
must choose between estimating respondents’ Willingness To Accept
(WTA) compensations for forgoing access to a resource or their
Willingness To Pay (WTP) to access the resource. While discrete choice
experiments (DCE) have been successfully used to value local people's
WTA compensations to reduce illegal hunting activities in Tanzania
(Kaczan et al., 2013; Moro et al., 2013; Nielsen et al., 2014), asking
WTA questions when respondents do not perceive any rights over the
good being valued leads to biased results (Freeman, 2003). Indeed,
property rights are theorised to be the most important criterion de-
termining the choice between WTP and WTA formats. In this paper we
use property rights to mean a bundle of rights over forestlands as de-
ﬁned by Schlager and Ostrom (1992, p250–251), referring to access,
withdrawal, management, exclusion and alienation rights). In practice,
households may customarily perceive less than these full sets of rights
and the reality often involves a complex operationalisation of these
bundles of rights (e.g. Muttenzer, 2006).
The choice of WTA or WTP matters since they have consistently
been found to be empirically diﬀerent (Horowitz and McConnell, 2002;
Tunçel and Hammitt, 2014). Standard Hicksian economic theory pro-
vides two explanations for the WTA-WTP disparity (Randall and Stoll,
1980). The ﬁrst concerns the income eﬀect: WTP is strictly limited by
budget constraints while WTA is not. The second involves a closer ex-
amination of the theory of preferences and relates to the availability of
substitutes for the good being valued (Hanemann, 1999). The WTA-
WTP disparity may also reﬂect limitations in the standard theory;
prospect theory provides the most prominent alternative (Kahneman
and Tversky, 1979). Prospect theory posits that people deﬁne gains and
losses based on a reference point, normally the status quo, and losses
measured relative to this reference point have greater subjective sig-
niﬁcance than gains. While the eﬀect of the format on welfare estimates
has been well demonstrated, the choice of format might also aﬀect the
sign and statistical signiﬁcance of the attributes valued in a DCE survey
– the nature of such diﬀerences being less researched. A handful of DCE
studies have designed the survey to allow respondents to trade both
improvements and deterioration in the levels of attributes against the
reference level, entitling them to both ‘buy’ or ‘sell’ the attributes (e.g.
Hess, 2008; Bateman et al., 2009; Lanz et al., 2010; Masiero and
Hensher, 2010; Glenk, 2011). While such designs explicitly allow a
measure of WTA-WTP ratio, they have not explicitly framed the va-
luation questions in terms of WTA and WTP, nor have they elicited
whether the target population actually perceives a property right to the
good being valued. By explicitly asking respondents to think in terms of
receiving or paying money, and following up with debrieﬁng questions,
researchers may identify alternative explanations to the WTA-WTP
disparity that have been to date less researched. The ﬁrst aim of this
paper is therefore to examine the diﬀerences in the patterns of re-
sponses between the WTA and WTP formats.
A second aim of this paper is to assess the performance of the two
formats for estimating the welfare losses from forest conservation
policy in low-income countries on three criteria that indicate validity
(Rakotonarivo et al., 2016). The ﬁrst two criteria comprise measures of
content validity, i.e. whether the survey descriptions and questions are
“conducive and suﬃcient to induce respondents to reveal valid stated
values” (Bateman et al., 2002: 305). The ﬁrst criterion concerns the way
respondents perceive features of the survey. For example, whether re-
spondents found the survey scenarios to be plausible or believed in the
consequentiality of the survey (i.e. whether respondents care about the
survey outcomes and view them as having real policy impact, see
Carson and Groves 2011; Vossler et al., 2012). Therefore, all else equal,
the best format results in the fewest respondents with problematic
perceptions of the survey. The second criterion concerns the level of
protest responses, that is, refusals to trade-oﬀ diﬀerent attributes due to
a lack of compatibility between respondents’ beliefs and the given
format. When property rights to forestlands (or other resources) are
contested, respondents may have beliefs towards the policy that conﬂict
with the selected format (Meyerhoﬀ and Liebe, 2009). The third cri-
terion pertains to budget constraints. Where restrictions on resource
access have large welfare eﬀects and where household incomes are
close to survival levels, WTP may provide a biased estimate of the true
welfare impacts because it is constrained by respondents’ ability to
pay.1 We evaluated the two formats against these three criteria using
the DCE results, responses to six standardised debrieﬁng questions
(with all respondents) and qualitative debrieﬁng interviews with a sub-
sample of respondents.
Our third aim is to use the DCE and subsequent debrieﬁng inter-
views to investigate respondents’ attitudes to conservation restrictions
(irrespective of the valuation format) and perceptions of property
rights, and discuss the policy implications for REDD+ (Reducing
Emissions from forest Degradation and Deforestation) policy. REDD+
is often involuntary for local people who may be coerced into accepting
it (Corbera, 2015). As such, REDD+ may lack legitimacy and under-
mine social justice (Corbera, 2012; Martin et al., 2013). Strict en-
forcement of restrictions in such a context may also impose local wel-
fare losses that may not be mitigated by proposed compensation
schemes (Martin et al., 2013; Poudyal et al., 2016). Justice principles
enshrined in forest conservation policies in the tropics may not align
with local perceptions of just and legitimate environmental manage-
ment (Martin et al., 2014). In the next sections, we describe the study
design and data analysis. Results are presented in Section 4, followed by
the discussion and conclusion in Sections 5 and 6.
2. Material and methods
2.1. Study site
Our study site is Ampahitra Fokontany,2 in the south-west corner of
the Ankeniheny – Zahamena corridor REDD+ project in Madagascar,
where most farmers rely on swidden agriculture, and on collecting wild
products for subsidence use and trade (including building materials,
ﬁbres, foods). These people are, in the main, extremely poor and highly
vulnerable to economic or environmental shocks. The Corridor Anke-
niheny-Zahamena Protected Area aims to reduce deforestation in the
eastern region of Madagascar and has been regarded as one of the is-
land's top conservation priorities. It is the site of a pilot REDD+ project
ﬁnanced by the World Bank's BioCarbon Fund. It encompasses one of
the largest remaining blocks of rainforest in Madagascar (which spans
382,000 ha) and was formally granted a category VI protected area
status in April 2015 (Republic of Madagascar, 2015). It is co-managed
by the Ministry of Environment in Madagascar, Conservation Interna-
tional, and local community associations. Major pressures include ex-
pansion of agricultural lands through forest clearance as well as illegal
logging and artisanal mining (Ratsimbazafy et al., 2011). The average
annual deforestation rate in the region was estimated to be 0.63 percent
1 Local people heavily rely on subsistence farming. If their stated WTP estimates are
severely constrained by their monetary income, these estimates may not reﬂect the actual
value of the policy or good being valued. Yet, if they do not take income constraints into
account, their stated values suﬀer from hypothetical bias, i.e. their stated preferences
would diﬀer from their actual behaviour under real economic circumstances.
2 Lowest administrative unit in Madagascar.
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over the period 1990–2005 (Veriﬁed Carbon Standard, 2013).
In many regions in Madagascar, forestlands (particularly those
outside protected areas or in newly established protected areas) are not
de facto subject to well-deﬁned formal property right regimes: local
systems of customary tenure frequently mix with, and evolve in re-
sponse to, formal state-claimed ownership (Muttenzer, 2006). The
Ankeniheny-Zahamena corridor was formally gazetted as a protected
area in 2015. Before then, it was subject to successive waves of im-
migration mixing with well-established customary rights, and resulting
in the emergence of new rules and property rights regimes, which are
clearly misaligned with the formal property rights vested exclusively in
the state. These customary regulations determine who has rights to
clear the land and how, depending on whether the individual belongs to
an indigenous lineage, longer established settlers or more recent mi-
grants.
Tavy is the widely used term for swidden agriculture in Madagascar.
It is a central livelihood strategy for many rural Malagasy farmers, it is
an eﬃcient and low-input agricultural technique and represents a
strategy to manage risks to food security amidst climatic hazards or
market challenges (Harper, 2002). Tavy also takes on an important
cultural meaning: the slash and burn process is often accompanied by
rituals and blessings (Hume, 2006). Although rural people have long
migrated to urban areas to seek alternative sources of income, the
highly subsistence nature of many households, rapid population growth
in rural areas, increased competition from immigration, as well as the
very low adoption of alternative livelihood options still motivate most
Malagasy farmers to clear new forests for agriculture (Kull, 2004).
Clearance of primary forest in the tavy system is known speciﬁcally
as teviala and has been criminalized in Madagascar since the colonial
period (1896–1960), during which tavy and all burning of land were
strictly banned. State control over forest resources continued post-in-
dependence, but was seen as illegitimate by rural communities pos-
sessing de facto access to forests based on customary rights (Antona
et al., 2004). Tavy has often been viewed as a “necessary evil” by the
Malagasy government (Kull, 2004, p225): forest clearance has always
been considered a threat to Madagascar's unique biodiversity, however,
the government recognised the necessity of ﬁre (including teviala) to
rural farmers’ subsistence. During the ﬁrst republic (1960–1972) a
system of tavy authorisations existed and the legislation was less re-
pressive than the colonial period, although ﬁre enforcement still re-
ﬂected the previous colonial practices. Tavy legislation was relaxed
further during the second republic under the “ﬁve-year plan” of the
then President Ratsiraka (1975–1991) being characterised by a politi-
cally pragmatic tolerance instead of prescribing a complete ban (Kull,
2004). Pasture ﬁres and tavy permits (including teviala) were delivered
by local authorities throughout Ratsiraka's government, but in practice,
the tavy permit system functioned imperfectly if at all. Most burners
never sought a tavy permit, the actual number of ﬁres outstripped the
authorisations and the forest area cut and burned for agriculture was at
least ten times greater because of the lack of funds and monitoring
(Ramamonjisoa, 2001). Even to this day, while the issuing of tavy au-
thorisations oﬃcially ended in the mid-1990s (Kull, 2004), and teviala
is strictly prohibited on paper, the enforcement of the teviala ban is still
weak (if not inexistent in many remote areas) and rural farmers con-
tinue to clear forests to expand their agricultural lands according to
local norms (Kull, 2004).
2.2. Sampling and data collection
Since no map or census of households was available, we worked
with key informants at the fokontany level to construct a sketch map
showing locations of all villages in the study area. We identiﬁed eight
villages along the border of Ankeniheny-Zahamena corridor. We visited
each village and carried out detailed mapping of the households en-
suring that no isolated household was missed out. We identiﬁed in total
417 households residing within our study site across the eight villages.
With the aim of interviewing a minimum of 200 households in total (at
least 100 for each survey format), we randomly sampled at 65% al-
lowing for replacement from each village (proportional random sam-
pling) and surveyed 203 households in total. Surveyed households were
randomly allocated one of the two DCE formats (WTA or WTP), re-
sulting in a total of 102 WTA and 101 WTP responses. Of the sampled
households who were approached for the survey, only two declined to
be interviewed, and three withdrew from their interviews before
completion. Heads of households (95% were male headed) were the
main respondents but all available household members also attended
the interview. The DCE surveys were piloted in three phases between
February and June 2014 in nearby villages. The actual surveys were
carried out from June to August 2014.
The questionnaire comprised three sections: (1) socio-economic
characteristics of the household including education, household fea-
tures, land holdings and characteristics, other household assets, and
wealth indicators (such as food security); (2) the DCE survey; and (3)
six follow-up questions. The ﬁrst four follow-up questions were mea-
sured on a ﬁve-point Likert scale and concerned the survey itself, re-
lating to the ﬁrst criterion that we set up to measure the performance of
the formats: (i) trust in the payment vehicle, (ii) plausibility of the
survey scenario, (iii) perceived consequentiality of the DCE survey, (iv)
respondents’ stated perceived ability to negotiate compensations with
the government. The last two measured respondents’ attitudes towards
the policy, and are related to the second criterion: (v) perceptions of the
beneﬁts of forest protection, and vi) belief in the legitimacy of forest
conservation policy. These were measured on a binary (yes/no) scale.
We also conducted in-depth qualitative debrieﬁng interviews with a
sub-sample of respondents (N = 11 (11%) and 9 (9%) for the WTA and
WTP formats respectively). Interviews took place the day after the
questionnaire survey, and lasted from 30 to 90 min. Interviewees were
purposefully recruited to represent the full range of DCE responses to
both the WTA and WTP surveys and the interview was aimed at un-
derstanding respondents’ motivations for their preferences as well as
their thought processes. Similar inquiries have been carried out by a
handful of environmental DCE studies, but hitherto have been conﬁned
to developed countries (e.g. Clark et al., 2000; Powe et al., 2005),
mostly using focus group discussions. Although focus groups allow
participants to deliberate with others, in our situation, where a very
sensitive issue is at stake (illegal swidden agriculture), we felt that in-
dividual interviews were more appropriate and avoided the inﬂuence of
other participants in a focus group setting. The number of interviewees
was determined by data saturation, i.e. we progressively built up a
representation of respondents’ views and perspectives until a point was
reached when no new information was retrieved. Interviews were
audio-recorded with respondents’ consent.
2.3. Choice experiment design
The WTA and WTP DCE surveys were both designed to measure ex-
ante the welfare impacts of restricting forest clearance by examining
the trade-oﬀs local people would make between the right to clear for-
ests for swidden agriculture, cash payment, and support for improved
rice farming. The attributes and levels (Table 1) were informed by three
focus group discussions and pilot testing of the design with 50 re-
spondents in a park-adjacent community. The DCE questionnaires3
were administered by a team of ﬁve enumerators who all held at least a
bachelor's degree. Although we aimed to use the same payment levels in
both formats, extensive piloting showed that an acceptable level of
trading oﬀ in each format necessitated that the payment levels in the
WTP format are three times lower than those in the WTA format.4 We
3 Full DCE survey questionnaires are presented in sumplementary information.
4 Bateman et al. (2002: 390) also recommend using diﬀerent payment levels because
the WTA-WTP disparity reﬂects real and robust characteristics of people's actual
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are not therefore able to directly compare the magnitude of the WTA
and WTP, but we are able to compare the relative attractiveness of the
DCE attributes between the two formats and identify the socio-demo-
graphic and attitudinal variables driving respondents’ choices.
For each format, we combined alternative levels of the attributes in
choice tasks using an eﬃcient design that seeks to minimize the stan-
dard error of the coeﬃcients to be estimated (Scarpa and Rose, 2008).
The fractional factorial design was optimised for d-eﬃciency for the
multinomial logit model using Ngene 1.1.1, and based on information
on the signs of the parameters obtained from the piloting. The design
generated 12 choice tasks that were divided into two blocks; each re-
spondent was presented with six choice tasks. Respondents were ran-
domly assigned one of the two blocks in the experiment. The design
with zero priors and adding the reference alternative had an ex-ante d-
error of 0.04 and 0.07, and 0.003 and 0.002 when evaluated ex-post for
the WTA and WTP format respectively.
Each choice task was composed of three alternatives including the
reference level alternative (see Figs. 1, 2 and Appendix C). DCE surveys
usually include a status quo option (or do nothing or opt out). However,
in our case the status quo (households’ own current “levels” for each
attribute) would vary enormously across respondents, and elucidating a
status quo alternative would require respondents to reveal their current
participation in (illegal) forest clearance. We therefore opted for a
counterfactual where protection is totally lifted for the WTA format and
where protection is strictly enforced for the WTP format. Our study
protocol was reviewed and approved by Bangor University's Ethics
Review Committee.
2.4. Valuation scenarios
The background scenario of the WTA survey was presented to re-
spondents as5:
“Please consider a major foreign donor who would like to provide
you with some development assistance such as support for improved
rice cultivation technique. Such support speciﬁcally targets rice
cultivation on hills and aims to maintain soil fertility…Next consider
that the donor gives you other options and lets you choose between
an array of development assistance. For instance, the donor also
oﬀers to give you some cash that you can invest in any alternative
income generating activities of your choice. Such cash payment
would be managed by an independent external institution which
will provide you with savings accounts…. Next, please consider that
the government would make it possible for you to get a permit to
clear forests on one hectare of forestland. This would be new addi-
tional land, still very fertile on which you have a legal and en-
forceable title, this would be similar to the ﬁve-year plan of
Table 1
Attributes and levels of the DCE (reference levels in bold).
Attributes Description Levels Coding
WTA format: Total cash donations framed as
development assistance (3080 MGA = 1
USD)
Cash donations framed as development assistance that the household would
receive.
0, 3, 6, 9, 12, 15 (x106
MGA)
Continuous
variable
WTP format: Total cash payments made to the
government
Cash payments that would give individual households forest clearance
permits (similar to the “ﬁve-year plan” of then President Ratsiraka)
0, 0.5, 1, 1.5, 2, 3 (x106
MGA)
Continuous
variable
Number of annual instalments over which the
household will receive/pay the total
payments
The three levels of instalments allow a pragmatic estimation of the
respondents’ discount rates and provides information on the respondents’
ability to invest money.
1, 10,20 Eﬀect-coded
Support for improved rice farming This attribute was introduced as a sustainable and modern agricultural
package that includes productivity enhancing practices such as the use of
fertilisers, insecticides and/or herbicides.
No support, Support Eﬀect-coded
Teviala (clearance of new forestlands for
agriculture)
This attribute has three levels: i) no teviala (i.e. closed forest frontier), ii) a
permit for one hectare of teviala (a one-oﬀ opportunity), iii) free teviala
(similar to pre-colonial times before criminalization of teviala and, de facto,
to more recent periods of little or no enforcement).
Free teviala, 1 ha of
teviala permit, and no
teviala
Eﬀect-coded
Fig. 1. Example of choice card in the WTA format.
(footnote continued)
preferences 5 The script is only an excerpt translated back from Malagasy
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President Ratsiraka's government (1975–1991) where teviala per-
mits were formally granted to rural farmers. Please know that the
forest clearance permit on one hectare is a one-oﬀ opportunity…
Next, please consider that the government would make it possible
for you to get a permit to clear forests on an unlimited forestland
(i.e. not limited to one hectare).
So if you were oﬀered the choice below (Fig. 1), which one would
you choose? i.e. which one would be the best option for your live-
lihoods?”
Thus, in the WTA format, the reference level alternative is an open
access scenario, whereas in the WTP format, it is a strict protection
scenario. The WTP scenario was presented as follows:
“Please consider that you will be given the opportunity to invest in
improved rice farming which speciﬁcally targets rice cultivation on
hills and aims to maintain soil fertility…. Next, please consider that
you would also be able to buy a permit to clear one hectare of
forestlands. This would be like new additional land, still very fertile
for which you have a legal title. This would be similar to the ﬁve-
year plan of President Ratsiraka's government (1975–1991) where
teviala permits were formally granted to rural farmers. Please know
that the teviala permit on one hectare is a one-oﬀ opportunity. Note
that you can pay only after harvest. But please we would like to
kindly remind you to carefully consider whether you would be really
able to aﬀord the one you choose. Know that you would be paying
the government through state agents, and the permit would be legal.
Note that the Fokontany and independent stakeholders would also
be involved to ensure transparency…. Next, please consider that the
government would make it possible for you to buy a forest clearance
permit on unlimited forestland (i.e. not limited to one hectare).
So if you were oﬀered the choice below (Fig. 2), which one would
you choose? i.e. which one is the best option for your livelihoods?”
2.5. Data analysis
2.5.1. Treatment of debrieﬁng statements
We conducted exploratory factor analyses on the six debrieﬁng
statements separately for the WTA and WTP samples. Factor analyses
aimed to generate factor scores that represent the underlying constructs
by condensing a large number of variables into a smaller set of latent
variables or factors (Thompson, 2004). Results show that for both
samples, the ﬁrst four statements (trust in the payment vehicle, plau-
sibility of the survey scenario, perceived consequentiality of the survey,
perceived ability to negotiate compensations with the government)
loaded highly on the same factor. The one-dimensional factor solutions
explained 44% and 42% of the total variance in the WTA and WTP
samples respectively. These results are consistent with the ﬁrst four
statements measuring the same latent construct whereas perception of
the beneﬁts of forest protection and beliefs in the legitimacy of forest
protection measure diﬀerent constructs, relating more to the policy
rather than the DCE survey. We therefore constructed an additive score
for each respondent based on the ﬁrst four statements related to the
valuation scenarios, ranging from 4 to 20 (using the ﬁve-point scales).
The score had a high level of internal consistency, as determined by a
Cronbach's alpha of 0.70 and 0.71 for the WTA and WTP samples re-
spectively. A smaller score corresponds to more problematic percep-
tions of the survey scenarios. We used this score together with attitudes
towards the beneﬁts of forest protection, and belief in the legitimacy of
state's protection in the discrete choice models to explain preference
heterogeneity.
2.5.2. Analysis of the DCE data
According to random utility theory, the utility of a choice is com-
prised of a deterministic component (V) and a stochastic component (ε),
which can be modelled to follow a predetermined distribution. The
utility function of an individual i facing a choice between two experi-
mentally created alternatives and a reference level alternative can be
described as:
=
⎡
⎣
⎢
⎢
⎢
+ =
+
U
V ASC X β ε n
V X β ε
( , , ) if reference level alternative
, otherwiswe,
( , )
ni
ni k ni
ni k ni (1)
Where Uni is the utility function for individual i, for alternative n. V is
the observed indirect utility, which is a function of Xni, a vector of
observable attributes and associated ﬁxed parameters βk. We specify an
alternative speciﬁc constant (ASC) for the reference level. We eﬀect
coded all the categorical coeﬃcient utilities to avoid inherent problems
associated with using dummy coding when including a ﬁxed com-
parator in DCEs (Bech and Gyrd-Hansen, 2005). The sign and sig-
niﬁcance of ASC cannot be interpreted when variables are dummy
coded as the ASC coeﬃcient may be associated with the utility of the
base levels instead of representing the utility of the ASC per se. For the
eﬀect coded variables, the magnitude of the omitted base level is equal
to the negative sum of the utility weights for the other estimated ca-
tegories (Louviere et al., 2000). We therefore added a column re-
presenting the adjusted marginal utility gains from the base level for
each of the eﬀect-coded attributes in Tables 2 and 4.
The random parameters logit (RPL) model or mixed logit model
allows utility coeﬃcients to be random variables to reﬂect unobserved
Fig. 2. Example of choice card in the WTP format.
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preference heterogeneity in a population. All parameters were assumed
to be normally distributed across respondents. If there is statistically
signiﬁcant variation in preferences for a particular attribute, this shows
up as a statistically signiﬁcant parameter estimate for its standard de-
viation (representing the spread of preferences around the average re-
spondent). The model presenting the best ﬁt was selected as measured
by improvements in McFadden's pseudo-R2 and Akaike Information
Criterion (AIC).
While RPL models control for unobserved heterogeneity by as-
suming that each individual in the sample has a diﬀerent set of utility
parameters, they require researchers to choose a particular parametric
form for the distribution of parameters and may be better suited to
assess individual level heterogeneity (Colombo et al., 2009). Latent
class models (LCM) capture preference heterogeneity by identifying a
grouping of individuals with homogenous preferences and readily allow
inclusion of observed measures such as socio-economic characteristics
or attitudinal scales to condition group membership and explain the
source of heterogeneity (Boxall and Adamowicz, 2002). Investigating
heterogeneity at the segment level would also be relevant to empirically
test whether a typology ﬁts a given dataset.6 We estimated a LCM for
each format and found that a 2-class model ﬁtted the data from the two
formats best according to AIC statistics and our judgement regarding
the interpretability of the results. We used the additive score of per-
ceptions of the survey (deﬁned in 3.1) and the two other attitudinal
statements as covariates explaining class membership of the LCM
(Table 3).7
Marginal WTP (MWTP) estimates were calculated as follows:
=MWTP
β
β
i
price (2)
Where βi are the attribute coeﬃcients and βprice are the price coeﬃ-
cients.
The standard errors and the 95% conﬁdence intervals for these es-
timates are obtained by using the Delta method (Hensher et al., 2005).
2.5.3. Analysis of the qualitative debrieﬁng data
Each interview was professionally transcribed for the purpose of
theoretical thematic analysis, which is explicitly analyst-driven. We
therefore used a coding scheme intended to generate themes or general
patterns that answer our research questions (Braun and Clarke, 2006).
Codes and themes were constantly revised based on new insights from
data analysis using Nvivo 10. We assigned each interviewee to one of
the two segments identiﬁed for each format in the LCM analysis, based
on the highest ex-post individual class membership probability
(Table 4). The interviewees’ characteristics are summarised in Ap-
pendix A.
3. Results
3.1. Sample characteristics
The two random samples diﬀer signiﬁcantly only with respect to
self-reported literacy and ethnicity at the 10% signiﬁcance level
(Appendix B). The average oﬃcial years of schooling (2–2.5 years) are,
however, not signiﬁcantly diﬀerent between the two samples. In the
WTA sample, Betsimisaraka, which is the indigenous and dominant
ethnicity in the study site, account for 79% of the total whereas this
share is 66% in the WTP sample. Due to the diﬀerent distributions of
ethnicity in the two samples, the ethnicity variable is included in our
discrete choice models to separate the eﬀect of valuation format from
any ethnicity eﬀect.
3.2. Diﬀerence in response patterns to the WTA and WTP formats
We found that in both formats, the price coeﬃcient had the ex-
pected sign: higher payments would signiﬁcantly increase and decrease
respondents’ utility in the WTA and WTP formats respectively (Table 2).
We cannot compare the size of marginal WTA and WTP estimates be-
cause of diﬀerent payment levels in the two formats. In the WTA format
respondents positively and signiﬁcantly valued the rice project, yet in
Table 2
Random parameters logit model (RPL) results. Mean eﬀects show the eﬀects on utility for discrete changes in each attribute for the average respondent away from the same baselines of no
cash donation, no improved rice project, and closed forest frontier. Standard deviation parameters show the spread in preferences around this mean eﬀect for each attribute and level
change. All parameters are set as random with a normal distribution.
WTA WTP
Coeﬃcient Standard error Adja Coeﬃcient Standard error Adja
Random parameters
Total cash donations (WTA) or payments (WTP) 0.08*** 0.03 −1.78*** 0.31
Instalment = 10 years 0.68** 0.31 1.35 0.47 0.26 0.82
Instalment = 20 years 0.39 0.31 1.26 −0.10 0.27 0.26
Improved rice farming 0.87*** 0.16 1.74 0.09 0.17 0.19
Permit 1 ha 1.31*** 0.39 2.63 −0.36 0.33 −1.68
Open forest frontier 0.01 0.66 1.33 −0.95 0.56 −2.27
ASC (reference level alternative) −0.75* 0.36 −1.35*** 0.45
Standard deviation estimates
Stdev Total cash donations 0.10** 0.03 1.77*** 0.25
Stdev Instalment = 10 years 0.81 0.50 0.14 0.77
Stdev Instalment = 20 years 0.83* 0.43 0.22 0.74
Stdev Improved rice farming 0.71*** 0.18 0.22 0.74
StDev Permit 1 ha 1.33*** 0.44 0.47*** 0.14
Stdev open forest frontier 2.73*** 0.39 0.82** 0.42
Stdev ASC 1.83*** 0.38 1.67*** 0.45
Log-likelihood −446.07 −498.85
McFadden's pseudo R2 0.31 0.25
AIC/n 1.56 1.69
Nobs 612 (N = 102) 606 (N = 101)
6 Recent advances in the modelling of choice experiment data and software packages
propose the use of random parameter latent class models to allow for an additional layer
of unobserved taste heterogeneity within a latent class. However, such heavily para-
meterised models have been criticised as being less robust and may introduce a poten-
tially confounding eﬀect (Hensher et al., 2013).
7 While attitudinal data may be endogenous to the choice data and not a genuine ex-
pression of fundamental attitudes (Provencher and Moore 2006), including them in the
model allows a pragmatic check of which attitudes are associated with diﬀerences in the
patterns of responses to the WTA and WTP formats.
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the WTP format respondents were indiﬀerent to support for improved
rice farming. WTA respondents strongly preferred to receive payments
spread over ten years (compared to a lump sum and 20 years) whereas
WTP respondents’ preferences for the instalment attributes did not
suggest any signiﬁcant patterns. WTA respondents preferred one hec-
tare of forest clearance permit to a closed forest frontier whereas the
WTP respondents appeared indiﬀerent between one hectare teviala
permit and a closed forest frontier scenario as well as between an open
forest frontier and a closed forest frontier scenario. In the WTA sample,
the ASC is negative and signiﬁcant at 10% level indicating that
households preferred a change compared with the ﬁxed alternative of
open forest frontier, ceteris paribus. The ASC representing the closed
forest frontier with no payment and no support for improved rice
farming is negative and highly signiﬁcant in the WTP format, sug-
gesting that moving away from the reference level of closed forest
frontier scenario would increase the average households’ utility com-
pared to alternative scenarios. The standard deviations of the cash as
well as forest clearance attributes (one hectare of permit and closed
forest frontier) were highly signiﬁcant in both formats, this implies that
there is signiﬁcant heterogeneity in preferences for these attributes.
3.3. Validity of the two formats
3.3.1. Criterion 1: respondents’ perceptions of the surveys
Respondents’ stated perceptions of the surveys are presented in
Fig. 3. The two formats diﬀered signiﬁcantly only in the perceived
plausibility of the survey scenarios and whether respondents viewed the
survey outcomes as having real policy impact (Mann Whitney test, z-
value =−6.57, p < 0.005 and z-value =−1.95, p = 0.061 respec-
tively).8
Table 3
Covariates used in the latent class models.
Variables Description Summary statistics
WTA (N = 102) WTP (N = 101)
Food security Numeric variable indicating the number of months a household has suﬃcient food
for two good meals per day.
Mean 5 6
Std. dev 5 6
Median 3 3
Ethnicity Binary variable indicating whether the household head is betsimisaraka (the
dominant and indigenous ethnic group in the study site) [0 = NO; 1 = YES]
YES 81 (79%) 67 (66%)
Perception score (from the factor
analysis in 4.1)
Additive score measuring perceptions of the survey scenario ranging from 4 to 20
(using the ﬁve point scales) (A smaller score corresponds to more problematic
perceptions.
Mean 13 11
Median 3 3
Median 13 12
Perceptions of the ecological beneﬁts
of forest protection
Binary variable indicating whether the household perceives any ecological beneﬁts
from forest protection [0 = NO; 1 = YES]
YES (missing) 63 (38%) 56 (55%)
7 4
Belief in the legitimacy of state's
protection
Binary variable indicating whether the household believes that the state's protection
is legitimate [0 = NO; 1 = YES]
YES (missing) 30 (29%) 23 (23%)
3 2
Table 4
Latent class models. Mean eﬀects show the eﬀects on utility for discrete changes in each attribute for the average respondent away from the same baselines in Table 2.
WTA WTP
Segment 1: Segment 2: Segment 1: Segment 2:
“Non-traders” “Traders” “Non-traders” “Traders”
Coef. s.e. Adja Coef. s.e. Adja Coef. s.e. Adja Coef. s.e. Adja
Total cash donations (WTA) or payments (WTP) −0.06 0.16 0.05** 0.02 −1.65*** 0.35 −0.72*** 0.17
Instalment = 10 years 1.27 1.68 4.41 0.14 0.20 0.38 −0.10 0.51 −1.03 0.42 0.26 1.41
Instalment = 20 years 1.85 1.61 4.99 0.10 0.19 0.34 −0.83 0.41 −1.76 0.55** 0.26 1.54
Improved rice farming 0.52 0.44 1.05 0.55*** 0.09 1.10 −0.40 0.27 −0.81 0.45** 0.18 0.91
Permit 1 ha 0.25 0.98 2.95 0.79*** 0.28 2.75 −1.50*** 0.48 −5.53 0.87** 0.43 3.11
Open forest frontier 2.45** 2.01 5.15 −0.39 0.46 1.96 −2.54*** 0.76 −6.56 1.37** 0.59 3.61
ASC (reference level alternative) 1.27 0.97 −1.03*** 0.35 −1.68*** 0.62 −0.65 0.40
Segment size (%) 14% 86% 53% 47%
Explanatory variables of class probability
Coef. s.e. Coef. s.e. Coef. s.e. Coef. s.e.
Constant 0.84 2.02 Fixed 3.66*** 1.39 Fixed
Food security −0.11 0.32 Fixed −0.22* 0.08 Fixed
Betsimisaraka 0.10 0.90 Fixed 1.05* 0.56 Fixed
Attitude scale −0.10* 0.09 Fixed −0.19* 0.08 Fixed
Perception of ecological services −1.47** 0.68 Fixed −0.18 0.55 Fixed
Belief in the legitimacy of state's conservation policy −0.13 0.78 Fixed −2.02*** 0.68 Fixed
Log-likelihood −451.87 −491.93
McFadden's pseudo R2 0.33 0.26
AIC/n 1.53 1.68
Obs. 612 606
Note: ***, **, * → Signiﬁcance at 1%, 5%, 10% level.
a Adjusted marginal utility gains from the base level situation for the eﬀects-coded attributes.
8 Mann-Whitney U tests for the eﬀect of socio-economic characteristics of the house-
holds found that only prior experience with World Bank social safeguard projects (de-
signed to compensate for the negative impacts of the Ankeniheny-Zahamena REDD+
project - See Poudyal et al., 2016) aﬀect consequentiality beliefs: households who have
received these projects have signiﬁcantly higher belief in the consequentiality of the WTP
survey (median Likert value = 4) than those who have not (median Likert value = 5) (z-
value =−2.49, p = 0.013).
O.S. Rakotonarivo et al. Land Use Policy 70 (2018) 71–83
77
In the qualitative debrieﬁngs, a WTP non-trader expressed very low
beliefs in the survey scenarios, particularly, the likelihood of a forest
clearance permit, given what he perceived as a burgeoning interest
among conservationists and the international community in forest
protection.
3.3.2. Criterion 2: compatibility with respondents’ beliefs about property
rights and legitimacy of state conservation
For both formats, we labelled one of the two-latent classes “non-
traders” because the response patterns (utility parameters and covari-
ates explaining class membership) and the qualitative debrieﬁngs in-
dicate that these households did not trade oﬀ the payments with sup-
port for improved rice farming and/or forest clearance permits
(Table 4). WTA non-traders (14%) signiﬁcantly preferred an open forest
frontier to strict protection but were indiﬀerent to the payments while
WTP non-traders (53%) were unwilling to pay for forest clearance
permits; yet moving away from the closed forest frontier reference level
alternative (ASC) to alternative scenarios would signiﬁcantly increase
their utility (Table 4). WTA traders (86%) preferred secure rights to one
hectare of teviala to a closed forest frontier. They also positively and
highly valued the support for improved rice farming. Traders in the
WTP sample (47%) stated positive willingness to pay for the improved
rice project and for forest clearance permits (both on one hectare and
unrestricted clearance). They also strongly favoured longer timeframe
(20 years) to one lump sum payment. Conversely, WTP non-traders,
appeared to be unwilling to trade-oﬀ the payments with other attri-
butes.
The acceptability of each format was measured by the rate of refusal
to trade oﬀ due to a lack of compatibility between the format and re-
spondents’ beliefs in the legitimacy of state's conservation policy. In
both samples, membership of the non-trading class was associated with
problematic perceptions of the survey. However, in the WTA sample, it
was also driven by disbelief that forest protection would have positive
impacts on their livelihoods (implying consideration of likely costs and
Fig. 3. Diverging stacked bar charts of the follow-up
attitudinal data.
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beneﬁts and a genuinely high WTA), whereas in the WTP sample, be-
liefs that state forest protection was illegitimate were more important
(implying protest responses), as well as low food security and
Betsimisaraka ethnicity.
The sign of the one-hectare permit and open forest frontier utility
coeﬃcients (negative and highly signiﬁcant relative to the baseline of
closed forest frontier) (Table 4) among the WTP non-traders seem to
suggest a positive WTP for forest protection (or WTA compensations for
weak or no protection enforcement). However, the qualitative evidence
suggests that they are negatively aﬀected by forest protection and their
responses actually suggest a protest behaviour (i.e. rejection of the
hypothetical scenario). These WTP non-traders experienced hardship
from strict forest protection. Although they were not willing to pay for
forest clearance permits, they claimed that the enforcement of strict
forest protection, which would be materialised on the ground in the
presence of armed law enforcement, would make their living much
more precarious than the current enforcement levels. They also argued
that they cared about forest protection but could not aﬀord it. Non-
traders in the WTA format shared similar rationales for their responses.
Both WTP and WTA non-traders viewed forest clearance as a necessity
amidst a declining standard of living and the ongoing inﬂux of migrant
smallholders.
However, WTA and WTP non-traders’ accounts also diﬀered in some
areas. WTA non-traders (I2 and I69) claimed that the revenue they
would get from clearing forests far outweighed the compensation levels
(supporting the LCM evidence that these non-traders were considering
costs and beneﬁts, rather than protesting). They asserted that cash is
ﬂeeting and teviala is much more sustainable. Their accounts did not
seem to allude to any objections to the survey scenarios, particularly
trust in the cash donations or plausibility of the scenarios (though the
LCM suggest this group are more likely to have problematic perceptions
of these survey scenarios than WTA traders). Their preferences were
instead anchored in the critical importance of new lands to their current
households’ livelihoods and their future descendants. However, they
expressed a lack of ability to negotiate compensations with the gov-
ernment.
We don’t really have the choice, do we? We’ve never had the choice,
so whatever the government decides, we will have to go with it,
even if the government gives as little as 600 Ariary [about US$ 0.2),
we have no say, anyway, the government won’t listen to us locals
hidden below the leaves.” (I2, WTA)
On the other hand, interviewees among the WTP non-traders (I14,
I15, I16, I20) were strongly averse to paying for forest clearance rights,
which they asserted as already theirs. They strongly objected to the
state's protection and claimed that they must not pay for something
they have been protecting for years from recent settlers. They appear
determined to assert their rights over forestlands:
“The valuation exercise was very disturbing, because if I pay for
something, that implies that I don’t own that thing yet, I cannot
purchase what's already mine. Asking me to pay is so illegitimate
because I have protected these forest patches and my eﬀorts in-
volved lots of sacriﬁce.” (I15, WTP)
3.3.3. Criterion 3: budget constraints
In addition to strong beliefs about their rights to forestlands, these
WTP non-traders were also averse to paying for forest clearance that
they saw as their subsistence livelihood. They claimed that asking local
forest dwellers to pay for teviala is highly nonsensical and unrealistic
because it ignores the very reasons for its practice (i.e. their poverty-
stricken status). Instead of paying, they argued that they should be
provided with some livelihood support. WTP non-traders also claimed
that the sale of forest clearance rights would likely favour those with
higher purchasing power, mostly the non-Betsimisaraka migrants who
have other non-agricultural sources of income.
However, only one WTP non-trader speciﬁcally mentioned that
their ability to pay was constrained by their income and risks. They also
asserted that if they had the means to pay for the improved rice
farming, they would rather invest money in buying fallow lands or
additional labour.
“You know that there are some good years and some bad years, so if
ever we are unable to pay, the government will withdraw the permit
and we will be left with nothing. Or could it be that the government
will be more indulgent to such cases? I don’t think so, an agreement
is an agreement….The support for the improved rice project is
particularly very risky, we cannot simply risk starving for one whole
year because we were too busy digging soils which will only yield
meagre crops”. (I16, WTP).
WTA traders were very receptive to the support for improved rice
project and stated that they would invest the cash mostly in the im-
proved agricultural techniques. While WTP traders were also willing to
pay for the rice project, they seemed to face considerable budget con-
straints.
“Since forest clearance will be strongly prohibited, we will have to
adapt. There is no other way round using fertilisers and using im-
proved techniques but we could not aﬀord the payments.” (I13,
WTP).
Respondents’ average marginal WTP estimates (for the traders’
segment) for one hectare of forest clearance permit amount to 1.2
million MGA (∼389 USD10), and represent about 136 per cent of
households’ average income11 in the region. Such ﬁgures conﬁrm the
subsistence-nature of swidden agricultural practices and the very low
compatibility of the WTP format with low-income.
3.4. Respondents’ perceptions of forest conservation policy
Over 70% of all respondents did not believe that state policy of
protecting forests was legitimate. In the qualitative interviews, WTA
and WTP traders strongly aspire to secure legal tenure over forestlands.
Both groups stated that strict forest protection would result in severe
hardship among local forest dwellers. They also expressed a strong
aversion to state protection claiming that the state is unable to enforce
protection and they are too vulnerable to the state representatives’
manipulation.
“I cannot imagine what would happen if this military protection
becomes a reality. You surely know how gendarmes work, they will
just impose whatever they want on us, and who are we to discuss or
ﬁght with them? They will always win, and they will restrict ev-
erything, they won’t even allow us to take ﬁrewood.” (I19, WTP)
“The ﬁrst thing that came to my mind was: will the state be able to
protect these forests, with all its problems and its instability? You
cannot rely on the state to do anything. Ever since I’ve lived here (25
years), our request to get a government-hired teacher has remained
vain, our children cannot to go to school because parents cannot
aﬀord teachers’ fees.” (I8, WTA)
Traders in both formats seem to care about forest protection and
claimed that they want to “breed” their forests. Nonetheless, they as-
pired to have the freedom to choose the forests’ fate.
“If only people have legitimate rights to own forest patches and
9 Interviewees’ identiﬁcation, see Appendix A.
10 3080 MGA = 1 USD.
11 These income measures were computed for a randomly selected sub-sample of
households in both the WTA and WTP samples (50 households in total).
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protect them, life will be so much easier and conﬂicts with recent
migrants will be reduced….But you can never predict what others
think, I do intend to breed mine, but others may decide diﬀerently
depending on their circumstances, as the saying goes: even if yams
grow on the same valley and use the same nutrients, there will al-
ways be ugly yams.” I10, WTA
However, while WTA traders (I1, I2-I5, I7-I11) only aspired to legal
tenure on one hectare of forest clearance and feared a tragedy of the
commons situation in an open access scenario, WTP traders were
willing to secure rights not only for one hectare permit but also for an
unrestricted access to forestlands; the act of paying for unlimited
clearance rights made them assume that they would be able to exclude
outsiders. A permit for one hectare would allow WTA respondents to
exclude others and assert their rights over forestlands as opposed to
customary ownership which are often disputed by recent settlers. WTP
traders (I12-I13, I17-I19) were willing to pay for forest clearance per-
mits to leave a legacy of natural forestlands with their future descen-
dants. They however begrudged having to pay for these rights.
“There is simply no way that we agree to relinquish our rights to
these forestlands, it is out of the question. But if we really have to
pay for our descendants, then we will pay, although we strongly feel
that we should not have to pay because we protected these forests.”
(I19, WTP)
4. Discussion
4.1. How do the patterns of responses diﬀer between the WTA and WTP
formats?
We found that response patterns diﬀer between the WTA and WTP
formats. The WTA respondents strongly favoured support for the im-
proved rice project and secure tenure for one hectare of forestlands
relative to no support and closed forest frontier respectively, whereas
the WTP respondents expressed no signiﬁcant preferences for either the
improved rice farming or teviala permits. Also, WTP respondents had
surprisingly no preference for delaying payments whereas WTA re-
spondents signiﬁcantly preferred that the payments (cash donations)
were spread over 10 years instead of a lump sum payment, due to a
limited ability to invest cash for the future (Rakotonarivo, 2016). While
the WTP and WTA formats have been shown to aﬀect the size of welfare
estimates (e.g. Bateman et al., 2009; Lanz et al., 2010), this study has
provided evidence that the valuation format can also aﬀect the response
patterns, i.e. the relative importance of diﬀerent attributes.
While we cannot rule out that the diﬀerent response patterns ob-
served between the WTP and WTP formats may be explained by severe
budget constraints among the WTP respondents, the use of much lower
payment levels in the WTP format could have lessened the disparity.
Nonetheless, the disparity may remain because of respondents’ strong
disbeliefs in the legitimacy of state's protection (as suggested by both
the quantitative and qualitative debrieﬁngs). We also made signiﬁcant
eﬀorts when developing the valuation scenarios to ensure that the rates
of refusals to trade-oﬀ between the two formats are not an artefact of
respondents’ low incomes. We instructed respondents in the WTP
format that they could pay after harvest time (in cash or in baskets of
rice) if they run short of cash. We also used WTP bids that are at least
three times smaller than the WTA bids.
4.2. Which format is best for estimating the welfare impacts of
conservation?
This study also aimed to assess the performance of the WTA and
WTP formats in our study context on three criteria of validity: re-
spondents’ perceptions of the survey itself; whether respondents were
unwilling to trade oﬀ diﬀerent attributes due to moral beliefs; and the
eﬀect of budget constraints. We found that the WTA format out-
performed the WTP format on all three criteria. The WTA format eli-
cited fewer problematic perceptions than the WTP. Only 15% of the
total WTA sample did not ﬁnd it plausible that a donor genuinely in-
terested in development would donate cash whereas 50% of the WTP
sample strongly disbelieved that the state would be selling forest
clearance permits (Fig. 1). Similarly, 73% in the WTA sample viewed
the survey outcomes as having real policy impact against 60% of the
WTP sample.
The WTP format resulted in higher rates of refusals to trade-oﬀ
forest clearance permits with payments (53% against 14% in the WTA
format) and this did not seem to be explicable simply by the payment
levels: respondents’ disagreement with the legitimacy of forest protec-
tion was highly signiﬁcant in explaining refusals to trade-oﬀ in the WTP
survey (Table 4) but not in the WTA survey. This is corroborated by the
qualitative debrieﬁngs which suggest that some respondents con-
siderably begrudged paying for forest clearance, because such pay-
ments would ignore their rights and past eﬀorts to conserve the forest.
Finally, the qualitative debrieﬁngs support the argument that the
WTP format is problematic in our study context because respondents’
ability to pay is severely constrained. Forest protection results in large
negative welfare impacts; teviala provides barely enough for subsistence
living and its substitutability with money is critically low. The quali-
tative ﬁndings suggest that although respondents highly value forest
conversion to agricultural lands, teviala may not produce much surplus,
but has a high labour eﬃciency which cannot be easily monetised, that
is, it produces agricultural crops with minimal drudgery compared to
improved agricultural techniques (Pollini, 2009; Scales, 2014).
Swidden agriculture has also many advantages that are not easily
substitutable by other alternatives (such as irrigated paddy ﬁelds)
(Pollini, 2009; Scales, 2014). In eﬀect, swidden agriculture allows
households to minimize climatic risks (e.g. ﬂooding or cyclones) asso-
ciated with lowland agriculture while paddy ﬁelds require signiﬁcant
inputs of labour or capital (Pollini, 2012). Given the very slow rate of
technological change (agricultural intensiﬁcation), it is likely that
swidden agricultural practices will remain widespread in the coming
years as long as convertible forestlands are available.
Most stated preference surveys ask respondents their willingness to
pay for a policy change, these are appropriate when respondents do not
perceive any property rights over the good being valued, or when the
value of the policy is likely to be small relative to their income
(Freeman, 2003). However, our results suggest that even where de jure
forest ownership rests with the government, suggesting that WTP
should be estimated (Mitchell and Carson, 1989), respondents may hold
strong protest beliefs that conﬂict with the WTP format and researchers
should thus also consider estimating WTA. In the literature, other ar-
guments against the use of the WTA format include the possibility of
strategic behaviour and extremely high WTA estimates that are incon-
sistent with neoclassical preferences (e.g. The NOAA panel – see Arrow
et al., 1993). However, the qualitative debrieﬁngs do not suggest any
evidence of strategic considerations. Our study therefore suggests that
the WTA format may outperform the WTP format in a rural developing
country context, which emphasises the importance of at least con-
sidering both formats. While our ﬁndings hinge on three criteria that we
have deﬁned a priori, other criteria could have also been considered.
Kim et al. (2015b) further suggest that where the WTA-WTP disparity
genuinely reﬂects respondents’ underlying preferences, the choice of
the correct welfare measure should be based on the likely explanations
for the WTA-WTP disparity (e.g. bounded rationality or value learning).
4.3. What are respondents’ attitudes to conservation restrictions and
property rights over forestlands?
Finally, this study aimed to investigate respondents’ attitudes to
conservation restrictions and property rights over forestlands. 73%
objected to state protection, arguing that they have been protecting
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forests by restricting, if not completely stopping, forest clearance. Most
WTA traders (86% of the total sample) shared the WTP traders’ stron-
gest aspiration, which is to secure their customary rights over forest-
lands. Since strict protection has only been recently enforced in the
Ankeniheny-Zahamena corridor and forest clearance used to be the
legitimate way to claim new resources and territory (Muttenzer, 2006),
the strong loss aversion exhibited by the WTA and WTP traders towards
forestlands ownerships may not be unexpected. These results do not
support other scholars’ interpretations that the WTA and WTP formats
both accentuate feelings of loss aversion, but in diﬀerent dimensions
(Bateman et al., 2002). That is, that by explicitly asking respondents to
think in terms of paying money, WTP prompts loss aversion behaviour
in the dimension of money whereas WTA prompts thoughts related to
loss aversion in the dimension of the good being valued. We found that
both WTA and WTP traders are loss averse with regard to the same
dimension, the good being valued, i.e. their rights to forestlands. The
WTP households’ responses primarily reﬂected their beliefs about the
legitimacy of the state's conservation policy.
The results indicate that the current model of coercive conservation
(that is, REDD+ building upon protected area regimes in which
clearing is strictly prohibited and forestlands are state-owned assets)
combined with the provision of compensations for the costs of restric-
tions may not be viable. Since REDD+ is involuntary for most local
people, coercive conservation lacks procedural legitimacy and may not
achieve full compensation, since estimating the opportunity costs of
stopping de jure illegal activities is diﬃcult, and compensations may be
poorly targeted or delivered. If local people perceive the state's pro-
tection policy as illegitimate or unjust, they may resist conservation
actions and engage in environmentally harmful behaviours (Milner-
Gulland and Rowcliﬀe, 2007) or they may incur losses (such as the
cultural values associated with teviala) that would not be mitigated by
most common compensatory schemes (Rakotonarivo et al., 2017).
Analyses of the REDD+ safeguard processes in the study site further
showed that compensations were vulnerable to elite capture and failed
to reach the most vulnerable or those who are most aﬀected by the
restrictions (Poudyal et al., 2016). Without a secure legal tenure, af-
fected people were reluctant to self-identify as engaged in illegal nat-
ural resource use because of fear of sanctions and consequently missed
out on compensations that were aimed at oﬀsetting the economic dis-
placement generated by the REDD+ project.
An explicit recognition of customary rights may be more eﬀective at
slowing down deforestation than the current coercive conservation
model embedded in REDD+ policy, especially given poor governance
in many developing countries (e.g. Moyo et al., 2016). This could be
achieved by establishing secure forestland tenure and enabling owners
to exclude migrants and outsiders. Our study highlights the importance
of locally legitimate property rights arrangements in REDD+ im-
plementation or other market-based instruments (Lockie, 2013; Dokken
et al., 2014; Sunderlin et al., 2014). As local communities may wish to
continue some forest clearance (Godoy et al., 2000), conservation may
then be negotiated with them, similar to the conservation contracts and
agri-environment agreements used in many industrialised countries
(e.g. Adams and Moon, 2013). When property rights are explicit and
locally perceived as legitimate, contract negotiations would provide
room for local people to claim incentives (cash or in-kind) for con-
servation eﬀorts. The voluntary and renewable nature of these agree-
ments would help ensure that opportunity costs borne by some of the
world's poorest people are fully compensated.
5. Conclusions
The patterns of responses to the WTA and WTP formats signiﬁcantly
diﬀer. The WTA format is more suitable in our study context because it
was perceived to be more plausible and consequential, it minimises the
rates of refusal to trade oﬀ because of ethical beliefs, and it is not biased
by severe budget constraints. Most respondents strongly aspired to
secure tenure and argued that they have better capabilities to protect
forests than the government. Respondents in both WTA and WTP for-
mats were very reluctant to relinquish their rights over forestlands and
more than 70% of respondents in both formats perceived the state's
conservation policy as illegitimate. Researchers using DCE in similar
contexts should not simply use de jure property rights to determine
which format to use. The choice of format may substantially aﬀect
welfare estimates, which attributes are signiﬁcant, the level of proble-
matic perceptions of the survey and willingness to trade oﬀ in the
survey. An inappropriate valuation format may seriously compromise
eﬀorts to determine appropriate compensation levels for coercive con-
servation.
Conservationists and REDD+ proponents should reconsider coer-
cive models of conservation (even with compensation) where these
align very poorly with local people's beliefs about customary rights.
Otherwise, the current conservation model (REDD+ building upon
protected area regimes in which clearing is strictly prohibited and
forestlands are state-owned assets) would risk harming local welfare,
and undermining a very signiﬁcant driver of conservation: local people
with secure property rights to the forest. Local people's inability to
prevent migrants clearing the forest, due to their lack of formal tenure,
as well as the diﬃculty of estimating the opportunity costs of pre-
venting de jure illegal natural resource use and the resulting problem
with delivering fair and legitimate compensations, all strengthen the
case for an explicit recognition of customary rights. Such recognition
might be achieved by the devolution of secure forestland tenure to local
people accompanied by voluntary conservation contracts negotiated
directly with forest owners.
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